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Abstract 
This paper develops a conceptual framework and offers new statistical evidence on the access to 
credit by micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in Guatemala and Nicaragua. To this 
end, and after reviewing the existing literature on the topic, it produces new empirical evidence 
drawn from the official Household Survey and the World Bank’s Investment Climate Survey, 
conducted in both countries in 2006. The core contribution of the paper lies in the critical 
revision of three pieces of common knowledge, namely: (1) A large fraction of MSMEs has an 
excess demand for credit; (2) In the presence of credit market failures, governments must and 
actually do assist MSMEs in gaining access to loan facilities; and (3) Alternative credit 
instruments, such as leasing, factoring, microcredit, and third-party guarantee schemes, can be a 
suitable and massive solution for the lack of financing. Our analysis refutes to a large extent 
these assertions and advances some basic policy prescriptions that should help improve the 
resource allocation and impact of specific MSME financial programs. 
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Introduction 
 
Since the 1990s the financial and banking literature has underscored the crucial role that 
credit markets may play in spurring the birth and growth of productive enterprises (see 
Levine (2005) for a survey). A natural extension of this research has been a revived 
interest in the financing aspects of policies aimed to promote the development of micro, 
small, and medium enterprises (henceforth, MSMEs). In a nutshell, the story goes as 
follows. The financial intermediation process is highly inefficient owing to asymmetric 
information between lenders and borrowers. The problem stems from the fact that 
borrowers have better information and control over the projects and enjoy limited 
liability on their unpaid debts, encouraging debtors to disguise the actual risk (adverse 
selection), to apply the funds to riskier projects once the loan is disbursed (moral 
hazard) and to falsely declare default. As a conflict of interest unravels, the misinformed 
creditors react by raising the cost of capital and even rationing its supply, which in the 
end undermines the ability of both good and bad projects to tap financial markets. 
Because of their opacity and poor business records, MSMEs are bound to be the prime 
victims of this market failure, which thus calls for a significant dose of state policies 
and financial innovation.  
 
In assessing MSME access to credit in Guatemala and Nicaragua, our paper puts 
forward and offers evidence on three hypotheses that go much against common 
knowledge in the field: first, the popular notion that MSMEs have a largely unmet 
demand for credit can be solidly refuted; second, government interventions can and do 
little to struggle with the alleged financial constraints faced by these firms; and, third, 
non-traditional credit vehicles –such as leasing, factoring, and third-party guarantees- 
are an optimal remedy to massively overcome the lack of financial access but are under-
utilized. Provocative as it may sound, we strongly believe that a realistic reformulation 
of the classical approach to MSME finance would be a healthy step towards much more 
powerful policies. 
 
The paper is organized in three main sections: The conceptual underpinnings of our 
hypotheses, illustrated with some data for Guatemala, Nicaragua and other countries, 
are presented in Section 1. Section 2 contributes new statistical and econometric 
evidence based on data from the national household surveys conducted in 2006 in both 
countries. The robustness of these findings is tested in Section 3 by going over 
comparable information collected by the World Bank’s Investment Climate Survey. 
Some conclusions and recommendations wrap up. 
Section 1: SME Finance: Confronting Conventional Wisdom with Facts 
 
This section is intended to set the ground on which the Guatemalan and Nicaraguan 
cases will be developed afterwards in Section 2. For the sake of clarity, it will be 
divided into three subsections on: supply versus demand factors affecting MSME 
financial constraints, public interventions, and alternative credit instruments. Evidence 
will be cited along the way. 
 
1.1 Access to Credit and Financial Constraints: Supply and Demand Factors 
 
After a relentless research effort over the last three decades, some broad consensus has 
been built around the problems with MSME credit. Here is what we know (see, for 
example, IDB (2005) and Bebczuk (2007)):  
 
(a) Lenders suffer from the asymmetric information syndrome, in that they are unable to 
clearly distinguish good from bad credits. As a result, financial markets may refrain 
from providing them with fluid funding at low cost because MSMEs are less transparent 
and financial documentation (if existing at all) is less trustworthy compared to that of 
large firms;  
(b) Some MSMEs tend to engage in close and lasting relationships with banks as a way 
of coping with informational asymmetries – personal knowledge may act as a substitute 
for reliable documentation;  
(c) By making the borrower share the burden of default, guarantees serve the goal of 
mitigating the two main manifestations of asymmetric information: adverse selection 
and moral hazard. However, many MSMEs are unable to pledge the collateral that 
banks often require to grant a loan. Furthermore, the situation is compounded in 
countries where creditor legal protection is flawed and poorly enforced;  
(d) Loan appraisal, monitoring and collection entail substantial fixed costs, making 
small-scale lending even more expensive; and  
(e) MSMEs have a priori a higher probability of default, as they are not diversified, 
have no financial shoulders to endure temporary downturns, and in some cases lack a 
sound business plan. Given the low expected survival rate, interest rates are driven up 
by the associated costs for the bank to recover the loan or repossess collateral. Again, 
the absence of agile and expedite judiciary ruling in this matter does nothing but inflate 
these expenses even further. 
  
A major statement of this paper is that the conventional wisdom has been excessively 
concerned about supply over demand factors. The above list enumerates reasons why 
banks and other lenders would be indisposed to extend credit to this segment of firms, 
implicitly suggesting that a large number of MSMEs have good investment 
opportunities and would be willing to borrow in order to put such projects in motion, 
but they are unable to do so because credit is too costly or unavailable.   
 
This belief overlooks the demand side of the credit market. From the perspective of the 
typical MSME owner, a battery of arguments backs up our position that in many 
circumstances financial debt may be profit- and welfare-reducing vis-à-vis internal 
funds, inducing in practice a scarce use of debt (see Bebczuk and Garegnani (2006) and 
the references therein):1  
 
(a) Asymmetric Information Premium: Imperfect information about the ability and 
willingness to repay leads lenders to charge higher interest rates, shorten the loan 
maturity, and shrink the loan size, so as to create a mismatch between financial needs 
and supply. By definition, the reinvestment of earnings is not exposed to these 
complications (provided, of course, that the firm has the capacity to generate and retain 
revenues). 
(b) Procyclical Services: Unlike equity, debt contracts are based on a fixed interest rate 
independent of the project’s return. This means that adverse shocks on costs or sales 
may push the borrower into financial distress or bankruptcy. This setback is magnified 
in the case of short-term agreements that allow the lender to periodically revise the 
interest rate. In the face of an adverse shock and the larger repayment risk involved, the 
lender is prone to increase the interest rate or even call off the loan. In other words, 
                                                 
1 Many of the following arguments also hold for equity, but this rarely is a source of funds for a SME (or 
even for a big firm) in Latin America. Also note that some points, but not all, just rephrase the previous 
supply constraints. This happens because what we observe is the market clearing equilibrium between 
demand and supply, and so everything that affects the supply will affect the demand –provided these are 
well-behaved functions. For example, if lending costs go up (the supply curve moves to the left), 
equilibrium demand will shrink as well. 
credit conditions harden when cheap credit is needed the most. Once again, the 
availabilty of internal funds is not hazarded by lender’s behavior.2 
(c)  Intermediation and bankruptcy costs: Financial institutions charge for their service 
as intermediaries between savers and borrowers –this cost is reflected in the spread 
between the deposit and the loan interest rate. Likewise, the interest rate also embodies 
the expected cost of bankruptcy, that is, the legal and related expenses to repossess 
collateral or liquidate the company. On the contrary, internal funds are absolutely free 
from these costs.3  
 (d) Suboptimal investment decisions: A fully self-financed profit-maximizing 
entrepreneur will a priori take on projects with the highest net present value and the 
lowest risk. Under certain conditions, as a lender-borrower conflict arises, a leveraged 
firm may be inclined towards riskier projects (asset substitution) or passing up good 
investment opportunities (underinvestment); and  
(e) Formality and external control costs: To become eligible for a loan from a formal 
institution, borrowers must meet a series of requirements, including certified 
bookkeeping, legal business licensing, and tax compliance. For an informal business, 
this would add steep costs. At the same time, creditors will feel entitled to watch over 
their money by exerting some influence over business decisions. Some owners may well 
be reluctant to relinquish power within the company (see LeCornu et al. (1996)), and 
thus debt will have a psychological disutility in these cases. 
 
This invites the question as to what we understand by a financially constrained MSME. 
Strictly speaking, that would be a firm willing to use internal funds to undertake 
profitable projects but, lacking those funds, is unable to obtain capital at a similar cost 
(or at any cost, for that matter).4 In this way, we must disregard cases where credit: (i) is 
not used because of insufficient demand – some firms may not need external funding, 
be it due to lack of good investment opportunities or to adequate internal funding; or (ii) 
is not used because the entrepreneur chooses not to issue debt even when experiencing a 
shortage of internal funding; and (iii) is over-used because of moral hazard –some firms 
                                                 
2 Internal funds are also procyclical but, being a form of equity, it does not create any fixed obligation for 
the entrepreneur that could lead to bankruptcy. 
3 Although they do not involve any intermediation cost, internal funds have an opportunity cost, and a 
potential misuse of internal funds could occur when the entrepreneur underestimates it. 
4 In a more general setup, the financial constraint should be characterized in a broader sense to include all 
all credit conditions, namely: amount, interest rate, maturity, and collateral, all of which will be discussed 
throughout the paper. 
may borrow to develop projects that they would not with their own money, so as to take 
advantage of their limited liability. Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the subset of 
financially constrained firms, which corresponds to the area where the three sets 
intersect. Conversely, the usual practice tends to overestimate the number of firms in 
this situation by including the pairwise intersections. A fundamental point to stress is 
that, strictly speaking, we will be concerned about access to credit and not about credit 
constraints. This is a subtle but critical difference: the access to credit issue asks about 
who applies and obtains credit, and inquires the reasons behind it; the financial 
constraint issue asks about who has a good project and then applies and obtains credit. 
The difference, as illustrated in Figure 1, is that our investigation on access to credit 
leaves aside the question as to whether the enterprise has a profitable project.5 In other 
words, a financially constrained enterprise necessarily has a limited access to credit, but 
the reverse is not necessarily true -for example, a firm that is turned down by a bank but 
has no valuable project has restricted access to credit but it is not credit constrained. 
 
It is important to notice that related World Bank work on financial access in Latin 
America employs a different definition of financial constraint that is akin to our 
operational definition of lacking access to credit. For example, Love (2007) resorts to 
the Investment Climate Surveys to label as Constrained those firms that: (1) applied for 
a loan but have been rejected, or (2) have not applied for a loan for reasons other than 
“don´t need a loan”.  
 
 
                                                 
5 This is actually the classification criterion adopted by the pioneering empirical work on financial 
constraints by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), which had a widespread influence on the scholar 
approach to this topic (see also Hubbard (1998) for a survey). They test the presence of financial 
constraints by running a regression of investment expenditures on firm’s cash flows, but controlling for 
growth opportunities, proxied in their analysis by Tobin’s q.  
Figure 1: Financially Constrained Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Profuse international evidence piles up in favor of a more balanced consideration of 
supply and demand forces. Beginning on a general note, current levels of financial 
development are consistent, prima facie, with a low participation of the populace at 
large in the banking system.6 Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007) display 
financial outreach indicators, showing that the number of loans for 1,000 people is 45.8 
and 95.6 for Guatemala and Nicaragua, against an average of 131.4 in LAC and 321.2 
in industrial economies.7  
 
                                                 
6 An imperfect and often  misleading measure of financial depth is the ratio of credit to the private sector 
to GDP, as it may not accurately reflect how many people actually hold financial instruments. In any 
case, it keeps some correlation with the figures in the text. As of 2006 (2005 in the case of Nicaragua), 
this ratio was 24.9% in Guatemala and 24% in Nicaragua, with an average of 33.3% and 121.4% for LAC 
and high income countries, respectively. The data comes from the World Bank Financial Structure 
Database, October 2007 version. 
7 Since a large number of people may have more than one loan, this indicator may overestimate the actual 
number of borrowers. 
9 Interestingly, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2004 a,b), document, on the basis of the 1999 
World Business Environment Survey, that a small sample of 32 firms in Guatemala and 44 in Nicaragua 
graded financial constraints as an obstacle for growth at 3.06 and 3.22 on a scale of 1-4 (with a 54-
country average of 2.87). However, these figures might be biased upward due to the so-called 
“pessimism” effect, by which entrepreneurs may tend to complain in excess, especially if they expect the 
survey results to be taken in consideration in the design of future promotion policies. At any rate, the 
discrepancy with the message in the main text is worth further research. For instance, the ratio of external 
financing is strikingly high when compared to other data sources. Our evidence in Sections 2 and 3 
forcefully contradict these findings. 
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The preference for internal funds over debt and equity is a conspicuous stylized fact for 
all firms. To sustain this point, we can cite some recent work on investment financing. 
First, for a sample of 15 OECD countries over 1970-2003, Bebczuk and Garegnani 
(2006) compute a corporate self-financing coefficient, equal to the ratio of corporate 
saving to investment, calculated for the aggregate of all domestic firms. The average for 
the whole sample is 91.25%, implying that for each dollar invested, 91.25 cents came 
from retained earnings and just 8.75 cents from external funding (debt and equity). 
Second, for the seven largest Latin American countries, Bebczuk (2003) estimates with 
a flow-of-funds methodology that the self-financing ratio was 81% in 1990-1996. 
Figures for transition countries produced by EBRD (2006) set this ratio between 62.4% 
to 77.3% in 2000-2005. 
 
Regarding the specific SME case, Grant Thornton (2003) runs a large survey of SMEs 
in 19 industrial and developing countries, and concludes that only 23% of all 
respondents said that the shortage of working capital was a constraint for their ability to 
grow. The percentage falls to 20% when asked about long-term capital. In a survey in 
transition countries, 67.4% of small firms declared not having any bank loan, but only 
30.4% admitted needing one (see EBRD (2006)).9 In turn, based on a survey of 1,200 
industrial SMEs in Argentina, Observatorio Pyme (2006) shows that only 8% of the 
investment expenditures is financed with bank credit, while self-financing represents 
83%. 
 
An interesting contribution is FELABAN (2007), which surveys 85 banks in more than 
20 Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries asking for their SME loan policies.  
A table from the survey is reproduced next: 
 
Table 1 
SME Loan Policies of Banks in LAC Countries: Survey Responses 
 
Do you consider the following as very 
important barriers for granting a loan 
to a SME? 
In % of total 
responding 
banks 
Lack of financial solvency 67 
Informality 53 
Lack of collateral 52 
Unreliable accounting statements and lack 
of transparency 44 
High administrative cost 34 
Source: FELABAN (2007). 
 
 
The table portraits the relative weight banks attach on average to some eligibility 
requirements. From a quick look, they all are in line with the barriers identified at the 
start of this section. But, in a second look, it illustrates subsequent issues raised 
throughout the section: first, none of these factors are unanimously qualified as “very 
important” (for example, operating in the informal economy is reported in this category 
by just about half of the respondents); second, the ranking of the answers suggests that 
banks are aware of the characteristics of the sector and have more lax requirements for a 
SME than it would have with a large firm (which is consistent with the relationship-
based loan arrangements with smaller borrowers); finally, the top factor is the lack of 
financial solvency, which, in terms of our previous discussion, means that banks are 
more likely to reject a client on the basis of the project’s productive quality rather than 
on other legal-wise requirements.  
 
An associated debate raised by the previous discussion, and present throughout the 
whole  paper,  is whether the incontestable bias towards self-finance is a consequence of 
weak demand or scarce supply of funds. It is well-known that the only directly 
observable figure is the equilibrium between supply and demand, and it is extremely 
difficult to disentangle one from the other. However, even without further research, it 
seems unlikely that the facts described so far are solely explained by supply factors, as 
sometimes implied in some credit policy analyses that emphasize that firms are willing 
to take debt but are just discouraged by burdensome administrative requirements and 
onerous application procedures. While acknowledging that a clear-cut identification of 
supply and demand factors remains an unsolved empirical challenge, our take is that 
demand factors play a more significant role than is usually thought. In this regard, we 
call attention towards the following: (a) The literature on capital structure strongly 
highlights that demand factors are key in explaining the low debt to assets ratio in cross-
country studies (see Myers and Majluf (1984) for the seminal theoretical article, 
Bebczuk (2003) for a textbook exposition, and Mitton (2006) for extensive evidence on 
Latin America); and (b) Supply barriers should be much more pervasive in the case of 
MSME (which are more opaque than big firms) and of developing economies (which 
have more shallow financial systems). However, the fact that the reliance on internal 
funds seems to be a worldwide phenomenon affecting all kinds of enterprises reinforces 
the hypothesis that demand factors are anything but negligible drivers of financing 
decisions. 
 
1.2 SME Credit and State Intervention 
 
Asymmetric information represents a market failure, in that risky and dishonest 
borrowers create a negative externality on safe and honest ones. As with any market 
failure, some state intervention may be warranted via the regulatory regime and, more 
directly, through the ownership of commercial banks.10 As a matter of fact, the financial 
industry is one of the most regulated activities around the world, on the grounds that it 
is the government´s duty to monitor banks´ moral hazard behavior so as to protect small 
and uninformed consumers and to prevent the systemic effects of financial instability.11 
While a widely accepted intervention, critics point to the strong assumption that 
regulators are benevolent and able to undo the potential wrongdoing of private agents 
(see Barth, Caprio and Levine (2003) for arguments and cross-country evidence). A 
similar controversy surrounds the operation of state-owned banks. Private banks may 
refuse to serve some clienteles because they are too difficult to screen and monitor, or 
because intermediation costs are prohibitively high. Small and young firms, as well as 
the population living in poor and distant regions, are hence likely to be excluded from 
formal credit markets unless they are served by socially-oriented public banks. 
Nonetheless, a usual caveat is that public banks suffer from severe agency problems 
themselves, as they are subject to distorting political interference, have managers 
appointed based on political connections rather than on professional skills, lack 
performance-linked remuneration structures, and enjoy some degree of regulatory 
forbearance. These conditions incubate socially harming actions, such as corruption, 
state capture, and soft-budget constraints. In the absence of the right incentives, proper 
                                                 
10 Other forms of intervention are the creation of second-floor financial institutions, the enactment of 
bankruptcy laws, and the creation of public credit registries. 
11 The desire to promote particularly strategic sectors from a policy point of view or to smooth business 
cycles are additional arguments in favor of the public ownership of banks, although these are considered 
as old-fashioned and obsolete by modern economics. 
 
 
accountability, transparency and checks and balances, these institutions are unlikely to 
perform as expected. The evidence supports this negative view. For instance, the public 
ownership of banks is associated with subsequent low financial development and 
income growth (La Porta et al. (2002) and Galindo and Micco (2003)) and a higher 
probability of crisis (Beck et al. (2003)). Descriptive and anecdotal evidence for Latin 
America reinforces the judgment that public banks make a dubious contribution to 
solving credit market failures, as programs have small budgets and unacceptable 
standards of disclosure and impact evaluation (see Bebczuk (2007)). 
 
Unlike other many countries where public banks still retain a significant market 
presence, they play no role in Guatemala and Nicaragua. After bold financial reforms in 
the 1990s, all public banks were privatized in Nicaragua, and the only standing one in 
Guatemala (Banco Crédito Hipotecario Nacional) has a 1.95% market share –measured 
by total assets- in 2006 (for an account of recent developments in banking sector 
structure, see Balsells (2007) on Guatemala and Ansorena (2007) on Nicaragua).12   
 
Lacking this backbone of public intervention in the credit market, it might have been the 
case that other non-financial government offices have taken over the task by offering 
not only direct credit facilities but also interest rate subsidies, guarantee schemes, and 
other supporting financial mechanisms. However, according to recent IDB research on 
LAC countries, active policies have a negligible outreach (see Angelelli, Roudry and 
Llisteri (2006) and Angelelli (2007)). Table 2 reports the central features of the 
organisms in charge of SME promotion in Guatemala and Nicaragua, which eloquently 
shows that these programs have tight budgets, small staffs, and marginal resources (US$ 
1 million in Guatemala and no program whatsoever in Nicaragua).13   
 
                                                 
12 It must be noted that the Nicaraguan Congress approved in late 2007 the creation of a new state bank, 
Banco de Fomento de la Producción. The plan is to have this new institution operating in 2008. National 
budget resources for US$9.5 million during 2008-2011 would be available to grant credit to micro and 
small producers. The senior management would be appointed by the Congress, with a Board composed by 
several national ministers. 
13 Table 3 below, taken from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2004), reports that development 
banks contributed in 1999 with 2.63% and 7.64% to the financing of investment expenditures in a sample 
of 32 and 44 firms in Guatemala and Nicaragua, respectively. Later on, we will present updated data from 
much larger samples. 
Table 2 
SME Promotion: Government Offices in Guatemala and Nicaragua 
 
 Guatemala Nicaragua 
Institution Vice Ministerio de Desarrollo de la MIPYME
Instituto Nicaragüense de Apoyo 
a la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa 
Functional 
Dependency Ministry of Economy 
Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce 
Operational 
Dependency Operates within Ministry Independent 
Year 
Established 2000 1994 
2005 Budget  US$ 1.53 million (0.005% of GDP) 
US$ 0.99 million (0.02% of 
GDP) 
Employees 70 60 
Is there a SME 
Law? No No 
Ongoing 
Support 
Programs 
Desarrollo institucional y 
de políticas de apoyo a la 
MIPYME (US$ 0.9 
million, 0.03% of GDP) 
None 
   
Source: Angelelli, Roudry and Llisteri (2006) and Angelelli (2007). 
 
 
The preliminary conclusion is that, in sharp contrast with the widespread official 
rhetoric about boosting the MSME sector, concrete initiatives are scarce and usually ill-
conceived. It remains to be seen what the feasible scope is for further efforts in the area 
in countries with structural fiscal difficulties, multiple unattended social priorities, and 
questionable resource allocation within the public sector.  
 
1.3 Alternative credit instruments 
 
In the face of asymmetric information, the most radical remedy from the lender’s 
standpoint is the posting of collateral, as it eradicates repayment risk regardless of the 
project´s outcome or the potential borrower’s misbehavior. Also to the advantage of the 
lender, collateralized transactions involve low costs and effort compared to the other 
strategies. 14 However, from the borrower´s side, an evident obstacle arises once many 
firms with good investment opportunities do not possess tangible capital to pledge.  
 
Ultimately, traditional loans suffer from serious drawbacks that have led market players 
to come up with other contracts to make lending to these groups viable. To distinguish 
them from traditional loans, we label as non-traditional or alternative credit instruments 
a number of contracts including the following: leasing, factoring, credit guarantee 
schemes, and microcredits. A lease is an agreement under which a property owner 
transfers the use of the property for a specified period of time. In a factoring transaction, 
a firm simply sells its account receivables at a discount to a financial intermediary (the 
factor). The seller benefits from transferring and prematurely cashing invoices typically 
repayable at least a month after being issued. The intermediary, besides getting a service 
fee, ends up facing the credit risk of the buyer, in spite of having dealt with the seller. 
Since many times the seller is a small firm and the buyer a big and reputable one, 
factoring is a risk-containing strategy for the factor. The various credit guarantee 
schemes are arrangements under which a third party commits itself to partially or totally 
cover lender´s losses in case of default. The guarantor can be a public o private entity. 
Finally, microcredits are small scale loans extended on the basis of a specific lending 
technology. As we will argue shortly, all these products, while different from traditional 
loans, may and are partly intermediated by commercial banks along with specialized 
intermediaries. 
 
Beyond their seeming differences, this variety of instruments share one feature in 
common: they break the link between borrower´s risk and repayment risk by providing 
                                                 
14The effectiveness of collateral crucially hinges on the quality of the creditor legal protection framework 
and its enforcement.  
different credit enhancements. This amounts to say that they embody different and 
innovative forms of collateral.15  
 
Microcredit is slightly different to the other instruments. As mentioned earlier, banks 
are especially well equipped to establish close lending relationships. The resulting better 
knowledge about expected cash flows, but especially the entrepreneur´s character, helps 
banks to struggle with their informational handicap. Microfinance institutions take fuller 
advantage of these relationships than traditional banks. Given their proximity to the 
borrowers and a smaller and more manageable loan portfolio, these institutions are able 
to better screen and monitor their clients. Adding to this, the microlending technology 
encompasses an array of incentive devices to ensure debt repayment, such as group 
lending (all borrowers within each group are held responsible if any member defaults, 
creating peer pressure and reputational costs), progressive schemes (performing 
borrowers are granted increasing amounts and terms in subsequent rounds of 
borrowing), and short-term, revolving lending. In a sense, these incentives work as 
intangible collateral.  
 
Nevertheless, at odds with the described mutual benefits, we do not witness, from the 
scarce information available, an intensive use of these credit vehicles in Nicaragua and 
Guatemala. Data on leasing are drawn from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2004 a, b), in turn based on the 1999 World Business Environment Survey, which 
covered more than 4,000 firms (80% SMEs) in 54 countries.16 Table 3 shows that 
leasing constitutes 2.78% and 0.91% of investment financing in Guatemala and 
Nicaragua, not far away from the world sample average of 2.63%.17  
 
                                                 
15 It is worth noting that, as a matter of fact, most of these instruments do not entail credit in the sense of 
financing activities that, after a while, will produce cash flows. Instead, they just provide liquidity, by 
transforming illiquid (but already produced, and sometimes sold) goods and services into cash. 
Nevertheless, such a service is extremely valuable for a large number of entrepreneurs. 
 
16 Unfortunately, Guatemala and Nicaragua are not surveyed in two major international reports on 
factoring (Factor Chains International) and leasing (Global Leasing Report). 
 
17 It is possible, but still unlikely, that leasing and factoring might be misclassified as bank loans, once 
they may be considered as collateralized and discounting operations, respectively. We looked at Central 
Bank data on total loans broken down by credit line, but in neither country those operations are recorded 
separately from other bank loans.  
Table 3 
Financing Sources of Firms (in %) 
 
 Guatemala 
(N=32) 
Nicaragua 
(N=44) 
Whole Sample 
(N=3,000)  
External Finance to 
Investment  
57.34 56.70 40.90 
Bank 28.38 19.32 19.0 
Equity 1.09 1.36 5.57 
Leasing 2.78 0.91 2.63 
Supplier Credit 18.72 15.23 6.72 
Development Banks 2.63 7.64 3.82 
 
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2004a, b) 
 
 
However, taking Latin America as a benchmark, the microcredit industry is relatively 
developed in both countries. According to data from Microfinance Exchange Mix for 
2006, there are 33 microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Guatemala with 465,000 
borrowers (3.7% of total population). In Nicaragua, 514,000 clients (10% of  
population) are served by 30 MFIs. The whole market in LA comprises 584 MFIs with 
a portfolio of 11.2 million people (2.8% of population). 
 
Regarding leasing, factoring and similar instruments, the scarce use should be traced 
back to the following elements: 
 
(a) Instrument specificity. Bank loans can be allocated to various ends agreed upon 
writing the contract (purchasing new capital, paying for debts or short-term liabilities, 
and so on). The other instruments do not enjoy such versatility, which in turn restricts 
their massive use. Factoring is an option only to firms that are suppliers of big 
companies. Leasing is only helpful for firms willing to purchase certain capital goods. 
Consequently, these products cannot be expected to become a universal answer to the 
lack of access to credit, as they are not suited to meet some basic financial needs. 
 
(b) Demand awareness. One apparent bias in MSME financing policies is that they do 
not seem to care or be aware of credit opportunities beyond traditional loans. For 
example, in a 2007 survey on 206 Nicaraguan SMEs, 74.3% acknowledged not 
knowing what factoring is. While it might be claimed that this search is time-
consuming, it is clear that internet capabilities have turn this argument obsolete to a 
great extent. Some behavioral inertia might be at work, especially for the less 
sophisticated entrepreneurs, for whom loan contracts are more familiar and simpler to 
understand than other contracts. Insufficient dissemination of private and government-
sponsored credit programs adds to the problem.  
 
(c) Market structure. In bank-centered financial systems, including Guatemala and 
Nicaragua, independent factoring, warrant and leasing companies are most likely 
deprived from adequate funding. Of course, banks are allowed to and in fact develop 
these lines of business within the bank unit or through a subsidiary. But this does not 
mean that banks actively pursue them. The FELABAN (2007) survey finds that only 
24% and 15% of the responding 85 LAC banks offer SMEs leasing and factoring 
services, respectively (see Table 4). 
 
Table  4 
Credit Services offered by LAC banks to SMEs 
 
What credit facilities 
do you offer to SMEs? 
In % of total 
responding banks
Mortgage 62 
Other Loans 58 
Overdraft 55 
Discounting 42 
Financial leasing 24 
Factoring 15 
Source: FELABAN (2007) 
 
Further investigation is required to assess the incentives banks have to lend through 
credit lines different from standard loans. Also, a deeper investigation should be carried 
out to evaluate whether regulatory and tax obstacles hamper the development of these 
instruments. Unfortunately, specific information on these markets in Nicaragua and 
Guatemala is notoriously scarce. 
 
Section 2: New Empirical Evidence for Guatemala and Nicaragua 
 
In this section we present newly produced evidence on access to credit in Guatemala 
and Nicaragua, relying on data drawn from the national household surveys conducted in 
2006. The main virtues of this dataset are that it was collected very recently, covers a 
very large sample of enterprises, and the content of the questionnaire matches very 
closely the purposes of this study. Our approach will combine a preliminary data 
description with some multivariate regression analysis afterwards. The discussion will 
focus on firms with less than 20 workers, because the sample of larger firms, that 
appears in the descriptive tables only for completeness, is small and thus scarcely 
representative.  
 
Before proceeding, it is important to highlight the scope and caveats of the subsequent 
analysis. The central concern of our study is describing salient patterns in the number of 
firms that ask for credit (the demand side of the market) and how many of them are 
granted a loan and many are rejected by the lender (the supply side of the market). 
Although this research question may look trivial on the surface, the lack of statistical 
data and some popular but mistaken statements about credit access turn this issue into a 
fascinating research subject and an extremely relevant point in the financial policy 
agenda. An important clarification, though, is that denied access to credit is a weak 
proxy for financial constraints, as it ignores the underlying characteristics of the 
entrepreneur’s project. According to our earlier definition, a rejected loan application 
implies the presence of a financial constraint only if one can make certain that the 
applicant had a valuable investment opportunity. Our study does not test for the 
presence of financial constraints, albeit it sets the ground on which such an investigation 
should build on.  
 
2.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 5 shows the main survey questions on access to credit for Guatemala. The sample 
comprises 5,866 enterprises, of which 5,687 have up to 5 workers (micro enterprises), 
168 between 6 and 20 (small enterprises), and just 11 between 21 and 91 workers 
(medium enterprises). The first confirmatory evidence of our earlier premises is that 
only 765 enterprises (13% of the total sample) applied for a loan. Within this subset, 
only 57 (7.5% out of the 765 applications) were rejected by the lender. Although such 
low rate of rejection –which is a uniform fact across the three firm size groups- might 
sound strange, it just reveals self-selection –in general, are the good clients the ones 
approaching the financial system.18  
 
Upon noticing that 5,101 firms (87% of the whole sample) just decided not to resort to 
external funding, it is extremely interesting to examine the reasons invoked for not 
applying for a loan. A majority of firms declare a preference for internal funding (49.2% 
of the total sample) and no need for a loan (23.7%). Jointly, these constitute 72.6% of 
total responses for the firms with 1-5 workers and 84.6% for those with 6-20 
employees. They likely reflect lack of demand, although the loose wording of the 
question makes it difficult to determine whether this is consequence of poor investment 
opportunities and/or reluctance to get indebted. It might even capture some supply-side 
forces, as the declared preference for internal finance may be driven by cumbersome or 
costly loan application procedures.19  Based on Figure 1 and the accompanying 
discussion is Section 1, firms providing such answers do not qualify as financially 
constrained, as neither are those claiming inability to repay, too high interest rates, or 
having an outstanding debt. These firms, which represent 3.5% of total, are most likely 
firms with unpromising or risky projects.  
 
The only category that might point toward a financial constraint is “People like me do 
not get credit”, which is the answer of 22.9% of the respondents. In principle, it could 
be hinting that these entrepreneurs envisage that they will not meet the informational 
requirements imposed by the bank and hence they exclude themselves. But for this to be 
labeled as a financial constraint, one should make sure that the entrepreneurs actually 
have profitable projects, which is a bold assumption in light of the blurry question 
formulation.  
 
                                                 
18 See Bebczuk (2004) for Argentina and, for Guatemala, the Micro and Small Business Survey 
conducted in 2006 by the Ministry of Economy.  
19 Regrettably, the questionnaire does not include a specific item dealing with the typical supply barriers 
(excessive documentation requirements, high fees, etc.). However, respondents had the Other option to 
express concerns about these obstacles, but it has a virtually nil weight in total responses. What is more, it 
is doubtful that “Prefers working with his or her own resources” is not a demand argument but a disguised 
supply constraint statement. 
Regarding lender’s rejection (57 cases), the motives are low income (21%), lack of 
collateral (9%), and failure to meet the lender´s requirements (70%). Prima facie, the 
two last ones suggest supply-side constraints, although more specificity would be 
desirable about lender´s requirements in order to establish whether they imply unfair 
treatment. For example, it is not the same being rejected because of lack of a credit track 
record (which is likely to happen in new or self-financed firms) or because of lack of a 
business plan (which is a legitimate argument to deny a loan).  
 
Table 5 
MSME Access to Credit in Guatemala  
 
1 a 5 6 a 20 21 a 96 Total
Number of enterprises in the sample 5,687 168 11 5,866
Number of enterprises that applied for a loan 723 39 3 765
   Number of enterprises that obtained a loan 668 37 3 708
   Number of enterprises that were refused a loan 55 2 0 57
Number of enterprises that did not apply to a loan 4,964 129 8 5,101
In % of total sample:
Enterprises that applied for a loan 12.7 23.2 27.3 13.0
   Enterprises that obtained a loan 11.7 22.0 27.3 12.1
   Enterprises that were refused a loan 1.0 1.2 0.0 1.0
Enterprises that did not apply to a loan 87.3 76.8 72.7 87.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Reasons for not applying for a loan (in %)
     Prefers working with his or her own resources 49.0 56.6 75.0 49.2
     There was no need 23.6 27.9 25.0 23.7
     People like them do not get credit 23.3 8.5 0.0 22.9
     Already has an outstanding debt 0.9 3.9 0.0 0.9
     Cannot repay the loan 1.6 1.6 0.0 1.6
     The interest rate is too high 1.0 1.6 0.0 1.0
     Other 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.6
     Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Reasons for not having obtained the loan (in %)
     Lack of collateral 9.1 8.8
     Low income 21.8 21.1
     Does not meet the requirements 69.1 100.0 70.2
Source: Own elaboration based on National Household Survey 2006.
Number of Employees
 
 
 
The loan features are displayed in Table 6. Notice that the sample includes not only the 
765 households that got a loan during the 12 months previous to the survey but also 
those who did it earlier than that, increasing the sample to 795. This, by the way, 
indicates that only 13.6% (795 out of 5,866) of enterprises have any debt at all. The 
three main financial sources are private banks (39%), credit cards (23.1%), and friends 
and relatives (20.8%). Government programs, with 3.5%, and NGOs, with 2.8%, make 
a modest contribution, against the presumption that economic units affected by 
informational problems are financially assisted by non-market mechanisms. A clear 
distinction, though, exists between micro (1-5 workers) and small firms (6-20 workers) 
in that the latter exhibit a higher proportion of formal sources, like private banks and 
credit cards (79.1% against 61.1%), and a lower share of alternative sources (informal 
lenders, government, NGOs, friends and relatives). 
 
The loan size of small firms is 3.7 times that of micro firms, and face lower interest 
rates (27.4% vs. 35.5%), longer terms (2.4 vs. 1.9 years), and lower commissions (4.2% 
vs. 1.8% of the loan value, reflecting the already mentioned fixed lending costs). Most 
firms are required collateral (79% for the whole sample), but only 37% pay a 
commission. In 58.2% of the cases the loan is allocated to business expenditures, as 
opposed to households ones. Finally, consistent with our earlier discussion, just 34.2% 
of the enterprises state that they would have wanted a bigger loan, making the concept 
of financial constraint even more controversial. 
 
It might also be surprising that loan conditions (interest rate, maturity, commission), yet 
worse than those available to big firms, are far from the abusive terms frequently heard 
of in media and professional reports. A plausible explanation is the self-selection 
phenomenon, once this subsample is most likely composed by sound enterprises with 
good projects.  
 
 
Table 6 
Loan Features in Guatemala 
 
1 a 5 6 a 20 21 a 96 Total
Number of enterprises 749 43 3 795
Source of the Loan (in %)
     Private Bank 38.9 41.9 33.3 39.0
     Government Program 3.6 2.3 0.0 3.5
     Credit Card 22.2 37.2 66.7 23.1
     Informal lender 4.3 2.3 0.0 4.2
     Credit Card 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
     Friends and relatives 21.2 14.0 0.0 20.8
     Empresa donde trabaja 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.6
     Empresa comercial 2.9 0.0 0.0 2.8
     NGO 2.8 2.3 0.0 2.8
     Others 3.3 0.0 0.0 3.1
Loan Amount (in quetzales) 14,543 53,334 37,000 16,726
Collateral (Yes = 1, No = 0) 0.78 0.91 1.00 0.79
Loan Term (in years) 1.9 2.4 2.5 1.9
Annual Interest Rate (in %) 35.5 27.4 22.3 34.9
Comission (Yes = 1, No = 0) 0.36 0.56 0.67 0.37
Commission Cost (in quetzales) 612 958 425 638
Commission to Loan (in %) 4.20 1.80 1.15 3.82
Use of the Loan
     Business Expenses 58.1 62.8 33.3 58.2
     Household Expenses 41.9 37.2 66.7 41.8
Would have wanted a bigger loan? (Yes =1, No =0) 34.71 25.58 33.33 34.21
Source: Own elaboration based on National Household Survey 2006.
Enterprises with a loan
Number of Employees
 
 
 
Tables 7 and 8, for firms with 1-5 and 6-20 workers respectively, split the sample 
according to whether entrepreneurs applied for a loan and obtained it. Within the micro 
enterprise group, applicants, either successful or not, seem to be better educated, living 
in urban areas, enjoying a higher total and hourly income, having more access to 
remittances from abroad, and working in non-agricultural activities. Of course this is 
just a preliminary observation based on simple averages, and thus it will be put to the 
test later on with econometric techniques. No major differences are found in house 
ownership, household composition, age, or gender. Also striking is that, in the small 
firms group, applicants and non-applicants are not distinguishable at first sight.20 
 
                                                 
20 Because the sample is too small (there are just 2 small firms that did not get the loan) we will not 
pursue the comparison between successful and unsuccessful applicants in the segment of firms with 6-20 
workers. 
 
Table 7 
Entrepreneur and Household Characteristics 
Firms with 1-5 workers in Guatemala 
 
Number of Enterprises 723 4,964 668 55
Characteristics of the Entrepreneur
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.84
Age 45.2 48.2 44.9 48.9
Education (*) 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.3
Marital Status (1=married, 0=other) 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.76
Number of Children below 18 years old 2.3 2.2 2.4 1.9
Household Size 5.4 5.2 5.4 5.4
Residence (1=urban, 0=rural) 0.44 0.34 0.44 0.40
Residence (1=Managua, 0=other) 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.13
Total Annual Household Income (in quetzales) 5,543 3,576 5,661 4,111
Annual labor income of the entrepreneur (in quetz.) 3,041 1,756 3,131 1,949
Weekly Hours Worked 44.2 41.8 44.5 40.2
Hourly Income (in quetzales) 14.8 9.6 15.0 12.7
House Ownership (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.71
Main Activity (% del total cases in the sample)
    Agriculture 43.3 58.4 42.7 50.9
    Low Technology Manufactures 6.2 6.2 6.6 1.8
    Rest of Manufactures 5.4 3.2 5.7 1.8
    Wholesale and Retail Commerce 27.5 19.7 27.3 30.9
    Other Sectors 17.6 12.5 17.8 14.6
    Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Receives remittances from abroad (1=Yes, 0=No) 12.7 11.9 13.0 9.1
(*) Illiterate =0, primary incomplete=1, primary complete=2, secondary incomplete=3, secondary complete=4, 
superior incomplete=5, superior complete=6.
Source: Own elaboration based on National Household Survey 2006.
Did not 
apply for 
a loan
Applied 
for a 
loan
Obtained 
the loan
Did not 
obtain the 
loan
Enterprises with 1 to 5 employees
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Entrepreneur and Household Characteristics 
Firms with 6-20 workers in Guatemala 
 
Number of Enterprises 39 129 37 2
Characteristics of the Entrepreneur
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.92 0.92 0.92 1.00
Age 46.7 46.1 46.6 47.5
Education (*) 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.0
Marital Status (1=married, 0=other) 0.95 0.91 0.95 1.00
Number of Children below 18 years old 3.4 2.9 3.3 5.0
Household Size 7.4 6.4 7.3 9.5
Residence (1=urban, 0=rural) 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.50
Residence (1=Managua, 0=other) 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.00
Total Annual Household Income (in quetzales) 16,325 14,497 16,930 5,130
Annual labor income of the entrepreneur (in quetz.) 10,604 10,749 11,110 1,253
Weekly Hours Worked 53.0 50.1 53.3 47.0
Hourly Income (in quetzales) 43.3 49.5 45.2 6.6
House Ownership (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.87 0.87 0.86 1.00
Main Activity (% del total cases in the sample)
    Agriculture 46.2 48.1 46.0 50.0
    Low Technology Manufactures 10.3 13.2 10.8 0.0
    Rest of Manufactures 10.3 4.7 10.8 0.0
    Wholesale and Retail Commerce 23.1 17.8 21.6 50.0
    Other Sectors 10.3 16.3 10.8 0.0
    Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Receives remittances from abroad (1=Yes, 0=No) 15.4 7.0 16.2 0.0
(*) Illiterate =0, primary incomplete=1, primary complete=2, secondary incomplete=3, secondary complete=4, 
superior incomplete=5, superior complete=6.
Source: Own elaboration based on National Household Survey 2006.
Applied for a 
loan
Did not apply 
for a loan
Obtained the 
loan
Did not obtain 
the loanEnterprises with 6 to 20 employees
 
 
 
In turn, Tables 9 and 10 explore the defining characteristics of the entrepreneurs who 
decided not to apply for a loan, classified by the seven specific response choices. Of 
utmost interest is the contrast between those preferring internal funding or not needing 
debt vis-à-vis the ones declaring that “People like me do not get credit”. Upon 
inspection of both tables, it is evident that those in the latter group attained a lower 
educational level, live in rural regions undertaking agricultural businesses, and earn less. 
As a matter of fact, they look akin to the entrepreneurs in the “Cannot repay the loan” 
item. This observation adds to the debate about the elusive concept of financial 
constraint, as it is hard to say that these firms, whose profile does not convey any signal 
of high productivity, are unfairly discriminated in the credit market. 
Table 9 
Entrepreneur and Household Characteristics of Those not Applying for a Loan 
Firms with 1-5 workers in Guatemala 
 
Number of Enterprises 2,431 1,173 1,158 43 79 50 30
Characteristics of the Entrepreneur
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.72 0.77 0.84 0.80
Age 48.0 47.7 48.7 47.1 51.8 48.3 48.6
Education (*) 1.0 1.3 0.6 1.8 0.6 1.1 0.7
Marital Status (1=married, 0=other) 0.83 0.82 0.78 0.74 0.73 0.84 0.70
Number of Children below 18 years old 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.2 2.6 2.1
Household Size 5.2 5.0 5.4 5.8 5.1 5.9 5.5
Residence (1=urban, 0=rural) 0.36 0.41 0.23 0.53 0.29 0.36 0.20
Residence (1=Managua, 0=other) 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.07
Total Annual Household Income 3,674 4,658 2,256 6,322 2,274 3,856 3,349
Annual labor income of the entrepreneur 1,857 2,317 1,010 2,859 798 1,481 1,781
Weekly Hours Worked 43.1 41.5 39.2 44.0 43.4 42.5 43.8
Hourly Income (in quetzales) 9.9 13.4 5.8 10.6 3.6 6.5 8.6
House Ownership (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.88 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.92 0.92 0.87
Main Activity (% del total cases)
    Agriculture 58.2 50.0 67.4 46.5 64.6 56.0 60.0
    Low Technology Manufactures 7.0 6.4 4.5 7.0 3.8 8.0 3.3
    Rest of Manufactures 3.7 3.1 2.2 2.3 3.8 8.0 6.7
    Wholesale and Retail Commerce 20.9 22.9 14.3 25.6 16.5 14.0 23.3
    Other Sectors 10.4 17.7 11.7 18.6 11.4 14.0 6.7
    Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Receives remittances (1=Yes, 0=No) 11.4 15.8 9.3 16.3 6.3 12.0 6.7
(*) Illiterate =0, primary incomplete=1, primary complete=2, secondary incomplete=3, secondary complete=4, 
superior incomplete=5, superior complete=6.
Source: Own elaboration based on National Household Survey 2006.
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Table 10 
Entrepreneur and Household Characteristics of Those not Applying for a Loan 
Firms with 6-20 workers in Guatemala 
 
Number of Enterprises 73 36 11 5 2 2
Characteristics of the Entrepreneur
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.95 0.86 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00
Age 46.0 47.9 43.8 38.4 52.0 42.0
Education (*) 1.8 2.6 0.4 1.4 0.5 2.5
Marital Status (1=married, 0=other) 0.90 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Number of Children below 18 years old 3.1 2.2 4.2 2.2 3.5 4.0
Household Size 6.5 5.3 8.7 6.0 8.5 8.0
Residence (1=urban, 0=rural) 0.45 0.56 0.09 0.60 0.50 0.50
Residence (1=Managua, 0=other) 0.12 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total Annual Household Income 10,296 26,297 4,053 21,694 2,261 7,082
Annual labor income of the entrepreneur 7,057 20,864 1,434 17,694 2,022 6,022
Weekly Hours Worked 49.8 51.4 46.5 58.4 44.0 46.5
Hourly Income (in quetzales) 32.1 99.8 7.2 59.9 7.0 33.3
House Ownership (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.84 0.94 0.82 0.80 1.00 1.00
Main Activity (% del total cases)
    Agriculture 54.8 22.2 81.8 40.0 100.0 50.0
    Low Technology Manufactures 12.3 19.4 0.0 20.0 0.0 0.0
    Rest of Manufactures 5.5 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
    Wholesale and Retail Commerce 12.3 33.3 9.1 20.0 0.0 0.0
    Other Sectors 15.1 19.4 9.1 20.0 0.0 50.0
    Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Receives remittances (1=Yes, 0=No) 6.9 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(*) Illiterate =0, primary incomplete=1, primary complete=2, secondary incomplete=3, secondary complete=4, 
superior incomplete=5, superior complete=6.
Source: Own elaboration based on National Household Survey 2006.
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The data for Nicaragua is more limited both in sample size (3,487 households) and 
questionnaire scope (it only distinguishes firms with and without credit, without asking 
about whether they tried to get a loan). But it is still a nice dataset to look for answers to 
our motivating questions. Table 11 shows the loan sources and other salient elements of 
the contract. As before, a minority percentage of firms (24.9%) has a loan. The chief 
providers of finance are informal lenders (31.7%), financial companies (27.2%), and 
suppliers (12.7%). Micro and small firms differ from each other in the weight of 
supplier credit (12.4% in micro and 19% in small firms) and that of informal lenders 
(32.8% and 11.9%). Once again, government funding is negligible (0.2%), but NGOs 
participate with 7.7% in the micro and 9.5% in the small businesses. 
 
As somewhat usual in other countries, including Guatemala, the proportion of 
collateralized loans is higher for small (81%) than for micro enterprises (50%), as the 
latter are frequently unable to post any physical guarantee. In both cases, the value of 
the collateral is more than 8 times higher than the loan value.21 Compared to Guatemala, 
loan conditions are less favorable: they are granted for less than one year on average, at 
higher interest rates (40.9% for micro and 22.5% for small firms), and with 
commissions that amount to 6.5% and the 3.5% of the loan for micro and small firms, 
respectively.22 Concerning loan allocation, business expenditures represent 46.4% in 
micro firms and 71.4% in small ones. Like in Guatemala, just 21% of the firms express 
a desire to get more credit. For this subsample, the desired amount is 121% (micro 
firms) and 39% (small firms) of the loan actually obtained. 
 
                                                 
21 Although it is to be expected for borrowers to post excess collateral to cover for valuation changes, and 
for the pecuniary and time costs of sluggish repossession legal procedures, this figure looks abnormally 
high. 
22 Taking into account that the reported rates are expressed in nominal terms, part of the excess interest 
rate of Nicaragua over Guatemala is due to the inflation rate (10.2% and 5.8%, respectively), but this 
accounts only partially for the difference. 
Table 11 
MSME Access to Credit in Nicaragua 
 
 
 
Tables 12 and 13 address the differences between entrepreneurs with and without a 
loan. For the micro firms, with up to 5 employees, we find that, as in Guatemala, a 
higher proportion of borrowers lives in cities, works in non-agricultural activities and 
receives remittances; moreover, they have more education and income. For small firms, 
which are a much smaller sample, we observe a similar pattern, except for the fact that 
non-borrowers have a higher income. In both cases, virtually no firm operates in the 
formal economy, as proxied by whether the owner contributes to social security. 
 
 
1 a 5 6 a 20 21 a 100 Total
Number of enterprises in the sample 3,339 137 7 3,487
Number of enterprises that obtained a loan 823 42 3 868
Source of the Loan (in %)
     Private Bank 1.3 7.1 33.3 1.7
     Government Program 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2
     Financial Company 27.2 28.6 0.0 27.2
     Credit Card 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.5
     Cooperative Banks 7.9 11.9 33.3 8.2
     Other Cooperatives 2.9 7.1 0.0 3.1
     NGO 7.7 9.5 0.0 7.7
     Informal lender 32.8 11.9 0.0 31.7
     Friends, relatives, and neighbors 4.7 0.0 0.0 4.5
     Rural Bank 1.3 4.8 0.0 1.5
     Suppliers 12.4 19.0 0.0 12.7
     Others 1.0 0.0 33.3 1.0
Loan Amount (in córdobas) 11,118 24,504 229,600 12,521
Collateral (Yes = 1, No = 0) 0.50 0.81 0.67 0.52
Collateral Value (in córdobas) 88,754 220,004 351,200 99,890
Loan Term (in years) 0.9 1.3 1.0 0.9
Annual Interest Rate (in %) 40.9 22.5 25.0 41.9
Comission (Yes = 1, No = 0) 0.25 0.44 0.67 0.26
Commission Cost (in córdobas) 721 850 3,550 757
Commission to Loan (in %) 6.5 3.5 1.5 6.0
Use of the Loan
     Business Expenses 46.4 71.4 66.7 47.7
     Household Expenses 53.6 28.6 33.3 52.3
Would have wanted a bigger loan? (Yes =1, No =0) 0.21 0.31 0.00 0.21
Additional Preferred Loan Amount (in córdobas) 13,491 9,465 13,207
Additional Preferred Loan Amount (in % of actual loan) 121.3 38.6 105.5
Source: Own elaboration based on National Household Survey 2006.
Number of Employees
Table 12 
Entrepreneur and Household Characteristics  
Firms with 1-5 workers in Nicaragua 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of Enterprises 823 2,516
Characteristics of the Entrepreneur
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.77 0.80
Age 46.7 47.4
Education (*) 1.4 1.1
Marital Status (1=married, 0=other) 0.76 0.75
Number of Children below 18 years old 2.1 2.0
Household Size 5.6 5.4
Residence (1=urban, 0=rural) 0.48 0.37
Residence (1=Managua, 0=other) 0.05 0.05
Total Annual Household Income (in córdobas) 70,933 51,165
Annual labor income of the entrepreneur (in córd.) 35,490 29,220
Weekly Hours Worked 45.7 44.2
Hourly Income (in córdobas) 13.5 11.2
House Ownership (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.86 0.85
Main Activity (% del total cases in the sample)
    Agriculture 52.9 63.6
    Low Technology Manufactures 5.1 4.9
    Rest of Manufactures 4.3 3.1
    Wholesale and Retail Commerce 24.7 18.1
    Other Sectors 13.1 10.3
Receives remittances from abroad (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.162 0.119
Contributes to Social Security (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.001 0.001
(*) Illiterate =0, primary incomplete=1, primary complete=2, secondary incomplete=3,
 secondary complete=4, superior incomplete=5, superior complete=6.
Source: Own elaboration based on National Household Survey 2006.
Has a LoanEnterprises with 1 to 5 employees Does not Have a Loan
Table 13 
Entrepreneur and Household Characteristics  
Firms with 6-20 workers in Nicaragua 
 
Number of Enterprises 42 95
Characteristics of the Entrepreneur
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.98 0.95
Age 44.1 51.0
Education (*) 1.9 1.7
Marital Status (1=married, 0=other) 0.95 0.94
Number of Children below 18 years old 2.7 2.4
Household Size 6.4 7.2
Residence (1=urban, 0=rural) 0.38 0.42
Residence (1=Managua, 0=other) 0.05 0.05
Total Annual Household Income (in córdobas) 9,702 15,748
Annual labor income of the entrepreneur (in córd.) 6,615 11,739
Weekly Hours Worked 50.7 48.5
Hourly Income (in córdobas) 31.7 53.3
House Ownership (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.98 0.88
Main Activity (% del total cases in the sample)
    Agriculture 64.3 75.8
    Low Technology Manufactures 11.9 3.2
    Rest of Manufactures 0.0 4.2
    Wholesale and Retail Commerce 11.9 9.5
    Other Sectors 11.9 7.4
Receives remittances from abroad (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.143 0.116
Contributes to Social Security (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.00 0.03
(*) Illiterate =0, primary incomplete=1, primary complete=2, secondary incomplete=3,
 secondary complete=4, superior incomplete=5, superior complete=6.
Source: Own elaboration based on National Household Survey 2006.
Has a Loan Does not Have a LoanEnterprises with 6 to 20 employees
2.2 Regression Analysis 
 
In what follows we carry out some multivariate logit regressions to uncover some 
factors behind the probability of applying for and getting a loan, using the same set of 
control variables as before. Given the narrow scope of our work (evaluating the access 
to credit using as main input enterprise surveys), the regressions that follow should not 
be interpreted as an econometric exercise to pinpoint the causal determinants of the 
access to credit. Our dataset does not include detailed information on the productive 
activity and performance of the entrepreneur, which should necessarily included in a 
correct specification of demand and supply credit functions. Actually, our more modest 
aim is to highlight some correlations between access to credit and some individual and 
household attributes that may be part of the set of explanatory variables but does not 
provide a full explanation about why an entrepreneur asks for credit and why he or she 
is granted it or not.23 
 
In the case of Guatemala, Tables 14 shows that the probability of applying for a loan 
increases with education, income and remittances, much in line with the simple 
statistics reported previously.24 According to Table 15, the probability of obtaining a 
loan depends significantly of gender (women have more chance of being granted one) 
and house ownership, but income and education, which came up as potential 
explanations earlier, have no bearing in the lender’s decision after controlling for other 
factors. This might be a consequence of self-selection (all applicants share 
homogeneous features) combined with the presence of unobservable characteristics 
driving the lender’s rejection –for example, lack of a well documented business plan or 
credit history.  
 
In turn, Table 16 suggests that the probability of not having demand for a loan 
(preference for internal funding plus no need for credit) as the main reason for not 
applying goes up with education, marriage, urban residence, income, house ownership, 
and non-agricultural occupation. The results are replicated almost identically after 
                                                 
23 By the same token, we do not run any selection bias test à la Heckman: for one, we are not interested in 
measuring with more precision the loadings of the right-hand side variables, because ours is a simple 
exploratory approximation to the problem and hence we do not have any particular hypothesis to check; 
secondly, one may want to correct for endogeneity bias once there is confidence on the overall 
specification, which is not the case here; and finally, the very lack of additional variables makes it 
difficult to identify a plausible exclusion restriction. 
eliminating other reasons for not applying and retaining only the “People like me do not 
get credit” response. This denotes that this reason is indeed highly correlated with some 
of the omitted ones (no ability to repay, high interest rate, previous outstanding debt), 
all of which imply that the firm is not in good shape. As a result, this finding reinforces 
the impression that the “People like me do not get credit” response is unlikely to be a 
clear-cut indication of true financial constraints as we defined them in Section 1. 
 
For Nicaragua, as reported in Table 18, the probability of having a loan appears 
positively and significantly (at 5% or less) associated to education, income, and 
remittances. Additionally, married firm owners are more likely to have a loan. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
24 It also increases with the number of children under 18, a result very difficult to rationalize. 
Table 14 
Logit Regression: Probability of Applying for a Loan 
Firms with 1-20 workers in Guatemala 
 
Explanatory Variables
Gender (1=male, 0=female) -0.0142 -0.81
Age -0.0004 -1.02
Education        0.0099 *** 2.82
Marital Status (1=married, 0=other) 0.0034 0.22
Number of Children below 18 years old        0.0047 ** 2.13
Residence (1=urban, 0=rural) 0.0134 1.30
Annual labor income of the entrepreneur (in quetz.)        0.0304 *** 7.77
House Ownership (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.0060 0.50
Agriculture -0.0097 -0.69
Low Technology Manufactures -0.0135 -0.75
Rest of Manufactures 0.0255 1.04
Wholesale and Retail Commerce 0.0089 0.64
Remittances from Abroad (1=Yes, 0= No)        0.0353 ** 2.18
No. Observations: 5,780
No. Observations =1: 755
No. Observations =0: 5,025
Correctly classified cases: 86.9 %
LR chi2(13) = 183.97
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.0411
Log likelihood =  -2148.16
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
Dependent Variable: Applied for a loan = 1, and 0 
otherwise
Marginal 
Effects Z Statistics
 
 
 
Table 15 
Logit Regression: Probability of Obtaining a Loan 
Firms with 1-20 workers in Guatemala 
 
Explanatory Variables
Gender (1=male, 0=female)       -0.0420 ** -2.14
Age -0.0010 -1.30
Education 0.0038 0.53
Marital Status (1=married, 0=other) 0.0410 1.04
Number of Children below 18 years old 0.0017 0.36
Residence (1=urban, 0=rural) 0.0085 0.42
Annual labor income of the entrepreneur (in quetz.) 0.0085 1.16
House Ownership (1=Yes, 0=No)        0.0970 ** 2.48
Agriculture -0.0201 -0.66
Low Technology Manufactures 0.0390 1.34
Rest of Manufactures 0.0372 1.24
Wholesale and Retail Commerce -0.0302 -0.95
Remittances from Abroad (1=Yes, 0= No) 0.0216 0.99
No. Observations: 755
No. Observations =1: 698
No. Observations =0: 57
Correctly classified cases: 92.3 %
LR chi2(13) = 27.28
Prob > chi2 = 0.0114
Pseudo R2 = 0.0675
Log likelihood = -188.42
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
Marginal 
Effects Z Statistics
Dependent Variable: Obtained the loan = 1, and 0 
otherwise
 
 
Table 16 
Logit Regression: Probability of Not Applying due to Lack of Demand I 
Firms with 1-20 workers in Guatemala 
 
Explanatory Variables
Gender (1=male, 0=female) -0.0064 -0.26
Age 0.0002 0.41
Education        0.0539 *** 7.59
Marital Status (1=married, 0=other)        0.0710 *** 2.86
Number of Children below 18 years old       -0.0121 *** -3.69
Residence (1=urban, 0=rural)        0.0729 *** 5.07
Annual labor income of the entrepreneur (in quetz.)        0.0345 *** 6.06
House Ownership (1=Yes, 0=No)        0.0761 *** 3.51
Agriculture        0.0425 * 1.87
Low Technology Manufactures        0.0930 *** 3.74
Rest of Manufactures 0.0157 0.39
Wholesale and Retail Commerce        0.0680 *** 3.21
Remittances from Abroad (1=Yes, 0= No)        0.0894 *** 5.10
No. Observations: 5,025
No. Observations =1: 3,671
No. Observations =0: 1,354
Correctly classified cases: 73.0 %
LR chi2(13) = 310.70
Prob > chi2 =  0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.0531
Log likelihood = -2772.78
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
Dependent Variable: Prefers internal funding or has 
no need = 1, Other reasons for not applying = 0
Marginal 
Effects Z Statistics
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17 
Logit Regression: Probability of Not Applying due to Lack of Demand II 
Firms with 1-20 workers in Guatemala 
 
Explanatory Variables
Gender (1=male, 0=female) -0.0141 -0.62
Age 0.0006 1.32
Education        0.0607 *** 8.53
Marital Status (1=married, 0=other)        0.0643 *** 2.66
Number of Children below 18 years old       -0.0095 *** -3.03
Residence (1=urban, 0=rural)        0.0774 *** 5.70
Annual labor income of the entrepreneur (in quetz.)        0.0360 *** 6.66
House Ownership (1=Yes, 0=No)        0.0902 *** 4.15
Agriculture        0.0420 * 1.92
Low Technology Manufactures        0.0868 *** 3.81
Rest of Manufactures 0.0320 0.84
Wholesale and Retail Commerce        0.0624 *** 3.12
Remittances from Abroad (1=Yes, 0= No)        0.0815 *** 5.02
No. Observations: 4,817
No. Observations =1: 3,671
No. Observations =0: 1,146
Correctly classified cases: 76.2 %
LR chi2(13) = 350.91
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 =  0.0664
Log likelihood = -2467.42
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
Dependent Variable: Prefers internal funding or has 
no need = 1, People like them do not get credit = 0
Marginal 
Effects Z Statistics
 
 
 
 
 
Table 18 
Logit Regression: Probability of Having a Loan 
Firms with 1-20 workers in Nicaragua 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory Variables
Gender (1=male, 0=female)      -0.0510 * -1.67
Age -0.0002 -0.27
Education       0.0128 ** 2.12
Marital Status (1=married, 0=other)       0.0528 ** 2.26
Number of Children below 18 years old       0.0083 * 1.92
Residence (1=urban, 0=rural) 0.0264 1.27
Annual labor income of the entrepreneur (in córd.)       0.0236 *** 3.08
House Ownership (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.0298 1.46
Agriculture -0.0443 -1.55
Low Technology Manufactures -0.0130 -0.34
Rest of Manufactures 0.0069 0.16
Wholesale and Retail Commerce 0.0073 0.27
Remittances from Abroad (1=Yes, 0= No)       0.0532 ** 2.23
Contributes to Social Security (1=Yes, 0=No)      -0.1599 * -1.91
No. Observations: 3,464
No. Observations =1: 860
No. Observations =0: 2,604 
Correctly classified cases: 75.3 %
LR chi2(14) = 79.19
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.0204
Log likelihood = -1901.71
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
Dependent Variable: Has a Loan = 1, and 0 
otherwise
Marginal 
Effects Z Statistics
Section 3: Checking Robustness: The World Bank Investment Climate Survey 
 
In order to assess whether the previous results are too sensitive to the sample at hand, 
we now present some statistics from the 2006 World Bank’s Investment Climate Survey 
(henceforth, ICS). The comparative advantage of this survey, relative to national 
household surveys, is that they have a broader coverage of medium and large firms, and 
includes a few additional questions that might be of interest to illustrate our arguments. 
Nevertheless, the main corollary from this section is that earlier findings are 
reassuringly robust.  
 
Table 19 breaks down the total sample by firm size, distinguishing micro firms (1-5 
workers), small firms (6-20), medium firms (21-100), and large firms (more than 100 
workers). Medium and large firms constitute 57% and 40% of the sample in Guatemala 
and Nicaragua, respectively. 
 
Table 19 
ICS Composition by Firm Size 
 
Firm Size Guatemala Nicaragua
Micro (1-5 workers) 36 61
Small (6-20 workers) 179 214
Medium (21-100 workers) 184 141
Large (101 or more workers) 107 44
Total 506 460  
 
 
An illuminating piece of evidence is the response to whether the access to finance is 
among the top 3 constraints for business operations. As seen in Table 20, an average of 
19.6% across MSMEs responded positively in Guatemala, with the figure rising to 
35.8% in Nicaragua. Compared to other Central American countries, with 27.4%, 
Guatemala seems to be doing much better than Nicaragua. This low values reinforce  
the assertion that financial constraints are not as pervasive as typically deemed to be nor 
are a problem across-the-board. However, it remains true that for large firms the 
problem is considerably less important than for MSMEs. 
 
 
 
Table 20 
Proportion of Firms Reporting Access to Finance 
As One of the Top 3 Constraints for Business Operations 
 
Guatemala Nicaragua Rest of Central America
Micro 26.2 38.7 26.0
Small 16.3 26.7 32.7
Medium 16.5 41.9 23.3
Large 2.2 5.7 5.3
Source: WB Enterprise Surveys, 2006.  
 
Tables 21 and 22 decompose the sources of finance of working capital and fixed assets 
in Guatemala and Nicaragua, respectively. The prevalence of internal funding comes up 
at once: based on simple averages, it amounts to 59% of total funding in Guatemala, and 
71.5% in Nicaragua.25 Non-market sources, including family and friends, suppliers and 
customers, and informal lenders, follow in importance. Still, private banks finance a 
relatively high share of working capital (8.8% in Guatemala and 16.8% in Nicaragua). 
We again observe the trifling contribution of government programs and non-bank 
financial institutions (including NGOs). Focusing on the loan providers, Tables 23 and 
24 confirm the predominant presence of private banks, the tiny participation of non-
bank institutions, and the even less perceptible presence of government credit 
assistance.  
 
                                                 
25 Of course, this fraction varies across firm sizes, type of capital, and country, but without a definite 
pattern or regularity.  
 
Table 21 
Sources of Finance in Guatemala (in %) 
 
Sources of Finance Micro Small Medium Large
Working Capital
Internal Funds 53.3 65.6 65.6 58.0
Private Bank Loans 4.0 8.4 14.0 13.1
Government Programs 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2
Family and Friends 1.4 5.7 1.5 0.5
Non-bank Financial Institutions 4.7 1.0 0.0 2.2
Supplier and Customer Credit 32.4 17.0 17.5 25.7
Informal Sources 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0
Others 4.2 2.0 0.7 0.2
Fixed Assets
Internal Funds 40.5 62.3 66.9 39.9
Equity Issues 0.0 2.6 4.4 2.4
Debt Issues 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.1
Private Bank Loans 0.0 7.5 1.6 0.1
Government Programs 17.1 2.1 0.2 2.9
Family and Friends 37.3 11.1 9.3 3.8
Non-bank Financial Institutions 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Supplier and Customer Credit 0.0 0.6 0.7 0.0
Informal Sources 5.1 13.2 15.7 43.1
Others 0.0 0.7 1.0 5.6
Source: Enterprise Surveys, 2006  
 
 
Table 22 
Sources of Finance in Nicaragua (in %) 
 
Sources of Finance Micro Small Medium Large
Working Capital
Internal Funds 78.2 59.6 64.4 62.0
Private Bank Loans 8.6 24.4 17.3 26.4
Government Programs 0.0 0.1 0.4 1.0
Family and Friends 0.9 3.7 4.2 0.1
Non-bank Financial Institutions 2.3 2.7 0.5 1.7
Supplier and Customer Credit 8.5 9.0 11.5 9.2
Informal Sources 1.2 0.5 0.7 0.0
Others 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.6
Fixed Assets
Internal Funds 98.1 69.4 59.5 79.5
Equity Issues 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.0
Debt Issues 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.0
Private Bank Loans 0.0 2.6 10.3 0.5
Government Programs 0.0 0.6 3.4 0.1
Family and Friends 0.0 5.4 1.5 1.7
Non-bank Financial Institutions 0.0 1.3 0.4 0.0
Supplier and Customer Credit 0.0 1.9 0.4 0.0
Informal Sources 1.0 18.4 21.2 17.2
Others 0.0 0.0 2.9 1.1
Source: Enterprise Surveys, 2006.  
 
 
 
Table 23 
Type of Institution Granting Loans in Guatemala (in % of firms) 
 
Firm Size/Institution Private Bank
State bank 
or  agency Non-bank (*) Other Total
Micro 85.7 0.0 2.5 11.7 100.0
Small 74.2 5.4 20.5 0.0 100.0
Medium 92.7 2.5 2.1 2.7 100.0
Large 98.6 0.0 1.4 0.0 100.0
Total 83.2 3.6 11.9 1.4 100.0
(*) Includes microfinance institutions, credit cooperatives, credit unions and finance companies.
Source: Enterprise Surveys, 2006.  
 
 
Table 24 
Type of Institution Granting Loans in Nicaragua (in % of firms) 
 
Firm Size/Institution Private Bank
State bank 
or  agency Non-bank (*) Other Total
Micro 92.0 0.0 8.0 0.0 100.0
Small 80.6 0.0 19.4 0.0 100.0
Medium 98.7 0.0 1.3 0.0 100.0
Large 96.9 0.0 0.0 3.1 100.0
Total 87.6 0.0 12.1 0.3 100.0
(*) Includes microfinance institutions, credit cooperatives, credit unions, or finance companies.
Source: Enterprise Surveys, 2006.  
 
 
The fraction of firms applying for a loan, shown in Table 25, reaffirms the apathy of 
most firms towards external financing. Less than 36% of MSMEs did actively seek a 
loan in either country, with a minimum of 8% for micro enterprises in Guatemala. In 
contrast, about 55% of large firms asked for credit. 
 
 
Table 25 
Firms that Applied for a Loan (in % of total) 
 
Firm Size/Country Guatemala Nicaragua
Micro 8.0 35.7
Small 26.7 29.3
Medium 24.0 34.3
Large 53.9 57.4
Source: Enterprise Surveys, 2006.  
 
Questioned about the motives for not applying, firms offered responses similar in nature 
to those documented in Table 5, based on the Guatemalan household survey. For all 
firm sizes, a minimum of 63% and a maximum of 93.5% claim that they just had no 
need for a loan. The second most recurrent motive was that the interest rate was too 
high. Repeating previous concepts, this statement does not clearly signal a financial 
constraint. This would be the case when the lender is charging too much to a high 
quality project, because of insufficient competition among credit suppliers or because of 
the incomplete information the lender counts on. But the interest rate may turn out high 
just because the project has a low probability of repayment. Other reasons that might be 
more comfortably –yet with no full confidence- associated with supply-side constraints, 
such as the complexity of application procedures or the strict collateral requirements, 
explain between 3.9% and 14.5% of total answers. Self-selection (“Did not think it 
would be approved”), another (weak) candidate for proxy of financial constraints, 
gathers no more than 12.5%, and zero in many cases. Generally, the distribution of 
responses from MSMEs and large firms look strikingly similar, contradicting the vision 
that the former have much more intense financial needs than the latter. 
 
Table 26 
Reasons for Not Applying for a Loan  
Guatemala, in % of total responses 
 
Reason/Firm Size Micro Small Medium Large
No need for a loan 65.6 74.8 78.6 86.3
Complex Application 
Procedures 6.3 3.1 1.6 3.9
High Interest Rate 12.5 14.5 9.5 5.9
Collateral Requirements 3.1 0.8 2.4 2.0
Insufficient Loan Size or 
Maturity 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0
Did not think it would be 
approved 12.5 0.8 0.0 0.0
Other reasons 0.0 6.1 7.1 2.0
Memo Item: Sample Size 32 131 126 51
Source: Enterprise Surveys, 2006.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 27 
Reasons for Not Applying for a Loan  
Nicaragua, in % of total responses 
 
Reason/Firm Size Micro Small Medium Large
No need for a loan 63.0 65.9 74.4 89.5
Complex Application 
Procedures 2.2 5.3 8.9 0.0
High Interest Rate 23.9 22.0 6.7 5.3
Unattainable Collateral 
Requirements 4.3 1.5 5.6 0.0
Insufficient Loan Size or 
Maturity 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0
Did not think it would be 
approved 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other reasons 4.3 5.3 3.3 5.3
Memo Item: Sample Size 46 132 90 19
Source: Enterprise Surveys, 2006.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
 
The goal of this paper has been to revise some widely accepted notions about MSME 
financing obstacles and the remedial tools to deal with them. Our attention was placed 
on the cases of Guatemala and Nicaragua, and we supported our technical stand with 
new data drawn from the national household and the World Bank Investment Climate 
surveys carried out in both countries in 2006, complemented by other relevant literature 
and statistical sources. Our three somewhat provocative conclusions are that: (1) The 
number of MSMEs that has an unmet demand for credit is significantly lower than is 
usually thought. Although the available survey data is not fully suited to rule out 
supply-side factors, our sense from the evidence is that demand factors play a 
significant role, well above that usually attached in credit policy analyses; (2) 
Governments do very little to revert the situation of  MSMEs going through financial 
constraints; and (3) Alternative credit instruments, such as leasing, factoring,  third-
party guarantee schemes, and microcredit are unlikely to play a decisive role in 
alleviating the financial status of these firms.   
 
Essential policy lessons emerge from these and other findings of the study, namely: 
 
a. State intervention in the credit market for MSMEs should be based on strict principles 
of management, disclosure, and accountability; 
 
b. In spite of well-known market failures, the private sector has provided more and 
better responses to MSMEs in search of finance than the state. In this light, first-floor 
credit channeling by the government should be restricted at a minimum, as in fact is 
Guatemala and Nicaragua. Furthermore, other pressing social demands and the chronic 
need for fiscal discipline makes it unlikely for governments to embark in wide-ranging 
financial assistance programs; 
 
c. In the case that governments decide to pursue more active credit initiatives, careful 
attention should be paid to the screening of financially constrained enterprises. As was 
strongly emphasized throughout the paper, a relatively minor fraction of firms warrant 
an intervention with net social benefit. Unfortunately, most programs hinge on the 
assumption that every MSME, almost by definition, deserves financial support. As these 
programs are not based on severe selection criteria and often carry a substantial cost 
subsidy, incentives exist for any firm to apply, even without any intention of using the 
funds for productive purposes. A professionally trained staff, with high ethical standards 
and free from political influence, may build a loan portfolio delivering a highly positive 
social outcome in terms of income and employment. To reach this goal, a crucial step 
forward is to design an objective methodology to target future beneficiaries of credit 
programs. Otherwise, fiscal efforts will be prone to be wasted; 
 
d. Governments may play a significant role in coordinating and providing financial and 
technical support to banks and non-bank institutions expressing an interest in increasing 
their outreach to MSMEs. The lifting of unjustified regulatory and tax barriers to 
suitable credit instruments is another field for healthy intervention. The alliance with 
multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank, the IDB and others, may serve as a 
catalyst for success. It is worth noting that recent experience around the world in the 
microfinance business proves that well-run private strategies focused on small and poor 
clients can be commercially viable and attractive; 
 
e. The state can also be of great help in boosting financial education for entrepreneurs to 
become aware of the benefits, costs, and risks of traditional and non-traditional credit 
alternatives. This knowledge will in time strengthen market discipline over financial 
intermediaries, which is no doubt the cornerstone of effective competition. In a similar 
vein, financial regulators should give more priority to consumer protection, offering 
technical and legal advice to MSMEs suffering unjust financial treatment by formal and 
informal intermediaries; and 
 
f. Continued official efforts to assemble broad and reliable databases with micro 
information on small-scale users of financial services will be most welcome as a part of 
a policy package. This information, to be made publicly available except for 
confidentiality aspects, will be extremely useful for the use of cost-effective credit 
scoring systems by private institutions and for professional research on MSME access 
to finance. Regular surveys carried out by local and international organisms, like those 
used in the present study, are also vital elements towards such goals. 
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